Tag Archives: artificial intelligence

20 Most Frequent Mistakes Startups Make (Especially AI Startups)

Paul Graham has spent the better part of thirty years writing things down. He built a startup, sold it, then spent two decades watching thousands more try to do the same thing through Y Combinator, turning what he saw into essays that read like advice from your smartest friend, not a consultant’s slide deck. I went back through his full archive on paulgraham.com – the early essays on founders and location, the growth writing, the piece on staying “default alive,” the one on the eighteen mistakes that kill startups – and lined it up against what roughly twenty-five other venture investors, across enterprise software, consumer, fintech, healthcare and deep tech, have been saying about the current wave of AI-branded startups. The pattern that jumped out: almost none of the new mistakes are actually new. AI just gives founders a faster, shinier way to make the same old errors, plus a handful of new ones stacked on top. Here are the twenty that show up again and again, whether the startup in question sells software, insurance, legal services, or diagnostics.

1. Nobody actually wants it. Graham’s oldest line still holds: there’s really only one mistake that kills a company, and that’s not making something people want. Everything else here is downstream of that. Founders fall for a model’s raw capability instead of a customer’s pain, and mistake applause at a demo for willingness to pay.

2. One founder, no partner. A solo founder isn’t automatically doomed, but Graham has long flagged it as a warning sign, because it usually means nobody who understood the space well enough was convinced to join. Investors watching AI teams describe the same pattern: a technical founder building alone, with nobody around to argue about whether the model is solving the right problem.

3. Chasing a safe, tiny niche. Picking an obscure corner of a market to dodge competition. Graham’s rule still holds: you can only avoid competition by avoiding good ideas. Because it’s cheap to spin up a narrow AI tool fast, founders chase micro-niches that only look defensible because nobody else has bothered yet.

4. Copying someone else’s idea. A derivative pitch – “it’s like that other company, but with AI” – usually fails because the founder has no first-hand insight into the problem. Investors describe a flood of near-identical products, built by teams who noticed a hot category rather than lived the problem.

5. Taking forever to ship. Graham has always pushed founders to launch fast and rough and learn from real use. AI teams still fall into the old trap of holding a product back for another round of polish instead of getting it in front of paying customers.

6. Betting the whole company on one model. Graham warned early founders about picking the wrong platform to build on. Today that means building an entire business on top of a single model provider’s API, with no plan for what happens when that provider changes its pricing or simply ships your feature for free.

7. A thin wrapper with no moat. This is the AI-era mistake investors talk about most. A founder puts a friendly interface on someone else’s model, charges a markup, and calls it a company. It works until the model provider ships that exact feature natively, and the business disappears in a release note. The ones built to last invest in owned data and real switching costs, not just clever prompts.

8. Hiding from customers behind the product. Graham’s advice to do things that don’t scale – manually recruiting and talking to your first users – gets skipped by founders who assume the model will do the selling for them. It won’t. Somebody still has to sit with a real buyer and watch them use the thing.

9. Raising far more than needed. A big round feels like validation, but Graham has pointed out the real cost: pressure to spend it, a harder time pivoting, and a company optimizing for its investors instead of its customers. In AI, oversized rounds too often get burned training a custom model before anyone proves the idea works with an off-the-shelf one.

10. Spending like you’ve already won. Compute bills alone can sink a company that mistakes usage for revenue. Graham’s simplest survival test still applies: assuming flat expenses and current growth, does the cash on hand actually reach profitability, or just the next round? Too many AI startups can’t honestly answer that.

11. Letting investors run the company. Founders who can’t manage their own board end up building the company their investors want instead of the one their customers need. Graham’s writing on this hasn’t aged: good investors want founders who push back, not founders who default to whoever’s loudest in the room.

12. Chasing margin over users. Sacrificing product quality for short-term profit – throttling usage, degrading output, adding friction to save on inference costs – kills the very thing that made people want the product. Graham flagged this decades before compute cost was a line item on anyone’s income statement.

13. Founders who won’t touch the unglamorous work. Founders who see themselves as purely visionary and won’t sit in on support tickets, sales calls, or the actual outputs their customers are seeing. Graham’s view has always been that the founders who get their hands dirty early are the ones who learn what’s actually broken.

14. Unresolved founder conflict. Cofounder blowups still quietly end more startups than funding problems do. It has nothing to do with AI, and yet it shows up just as often in this wave, because speed and hype put pressure on partnerships that were never that solid to begin with.

15. A half-committed founder. Graham’s closing point in his essay on mistakes was the simplest one: a startup takes full obsession, not a side project with a day job still attached. That’s just as true when the side project happens to be in a very fundable category right now.

16. Mistaking a pilot for a business. This one is newer, and it is everywhere in enterprise AI right now: a flashy proof-of-concept in one department that never turns into a signed, budgeted, company-wide deployment. Investors and operators increasingly describe this as pilot purgatory – dozens of promising demos, almost none of them converting into real recurring revenue.

17. Bolting AI onto an old workflow. Adding a chatbot to an existing product instead of asking what the whole process should look like once intelligence is cheap. The companies actually winning right now are rebuilding the workflow from scratch, not decorating the old one.

18. Ignoring the rules of the industry you’re entering. This mistake barely existed for a typical software startup, and it’s now one of the most common ways AI companies die. A tool that scores loan risk, drafts a treatment note, or writes a contract clause trips regulation built for a different era, and “we’re just software” stopped being a defense once real money, health, or liberty was on the line.

19. Confusing benchmark scores for customer love. Optimizing the product to look good on a public leaderboard or a slick demo instead of on the number that actually matters – whether a paying customer renews. It’s a seductive trap in this category because the leaderboards are public and the renewal data isn’t.

20. No answer for what happens when the model improves. Every AI company should explain, in one sentence, why it still exists once the underlying models are ten times more capable and cheaper. Some investors are uneasy enough about the pace of change that they’re telling founders of even successful AI companies to consider selling within a year or two rather than assume today’s edge holds.

None of this is really about AI, and that’s sort of the point. Strip away the model and the funding round and it’s the same list Graham has been writing about since before most of these founders could vote: build something people actually want, badly enough that you’ll do the unscalable, unglamorous work of getting it in front of them, spend like the cash is finite because it is, and keep your own team and investors pointed at the customer instead of each other. AI just handed everyone the fastest, shiniest way ever invented to skip that work. Don’t skip it.

Half of all Search expected to be Generative (AI) by 2028

Search Engines vs. Generative Engine Optimization (GEO): 2026–2031 Outlook

Industry: part of the fast-growing Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) category; search volume is projected to shift heavily toward AI answers by 2028.

Q3 2026 — Today

Google still holds ~78–88% of query volume/referrals (measure-dependent); top-ranking click-through has fallen sharply under AI Overviews. GEO market run-rate sits near $1.1–1.5B. Within AI chat, ChatGPT holds ~60–65% share, with Claude the fastest-growing challenger. Zero-click results already make up 43% of all searches, 93% inside Google’s AI Mode.

Q4 2026

Full-year mark for Gartner’s projected 25% decline in traditional search query volume. GEO vendor spend continues toward a $1.5–2B run-rate. AI-referred traffic converts at 14.2% vs. 2.8% for traditional organic. AI browsers (ChatGPT Atlas, Perplexity Comet, Dia) scale as primary front-ends rather than add-ons.

Q1–Q2 2027

Google likely keeps dominance on navigational, transactional, and local queries even as informational-query share keeps eroding. AI assistants push their share of informational queries past 15–20% toward the high-20s. GEO becomes a standard budget line rather than an experiment, and GEO measurement tools start standardizing, with early metrics appearing in platforms like Search Console.

Q3–Q4 2027

Traditional SERP-only sessions keep shrinking as answer-first UX becomes the default across major browsers. Forecasts point to roughly 30% of commercial queries being resolved entirely inside generative engines with no results page rendered at all. Per-platform strategy becomes essential, since ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, and Perplexity each surface and rank content differently.

2028 (Full Year)

Gartner’s upper-bound scenario has traditional search traffic down up to 50% from 2024 levels. Industry estimates converge near 50% of all searches being “generative” rather than a classic link list. GEO shifts firmly from “nice-to-have” to table-stakes for any content-driven business.

2029 (Full Year)

Google and Bing lean further into AI-native results pages, and the classic ten-blue-links format becomes a minority experience. The GEO services market keeps compounding at roughly 34–50% CAGR, and consolidation begins among GEO tooling vendors. AI-content-disclosure regulation and platform-specific GEO certifications start to emerge.

2030 (Full Year)

Traditional search engines reposition as one input among several inside broader “answer” ecosystems. The overall AI market approaches ~$826B, and GEO spend gets folded into standard marketing budgets as a default line item rather than a separate test. Hybrid SEO + GEO is now the accepted baseline for every digital-visibility team.

2031 (Full Year)

Traditional keyword search stays material for transactional and local intent but is no longer the primary discovery channel for research-type queries. The GEO services market reaches an estimated $4.1B–$7.3B (27.5–34% CAGR since 2024), with some models projecting even higher. Differentiated optimization playbooks per AI engine are now standard agency practice.

Note: public forecasts for this category vary widely by methodology — GEO’s 2031 market size ranges from $4.1B to $7.3B across sources, and Google’s share of query volume is reported anywhere from ~78% to ~89% depending on whether AI Overviews/AI Mode sessions count as “Google” or as GEO. Figures above use the midpoints of the most-cited 2026 industry reports (Gartner, Similarweb, Valuates, Mobility Foresights) and should be read as directional, not exact.

Somebody is going to build the DMOZ Open Directory for AI Search

The Open Directory, Reimagined for AI Search

A Feasibility and Business Plan for an AI-Era Web Directory

I. The Opportunity

In the 1990s, the Open Directory Project (DMOZ) became an authority signal: Yahoo used it to populate a hand-curated web directory, and early Google gave real weight to sites listed there because a human editor had vouched for them. AI answer engines now play a similar gatekeeping role, and the same gap exists again.

  • Citation concentration is extreme — current research on AI answer engines finds that a small handful of domains, chiefly Reddit, Wikipedia, YouTube, and LinkedIn, account for the large majority of citations across ChatGPT, Perplexity, Gemini, and Claude, leaving most legitimate businesses, nonprofits, and niche experts effectively invisible in AI-generated answers.
  • There is no verified trust layer for AI the way DMOZ once was for search; volunteer editors used to vouch that a site was real, correctly categorized, and legitimate, and no equivalent structured, human-vetted registry exists for today’s answer engines.
  • llms.txt is a map, not a directory — the emerging llms.txt convention only lets a site describe itself to a crawler; it carries no independent third-party authority, and as of 2026 no major AI lab has publicly committed to acting on it in production.
  • GEO spending is already flowing into an unproven category, as brands react to falling click-through and rising zero-click AI answers by paying for optimization services; that budget is actively searching for a credible, structural answer.
  • The underlying need is unmet: a neutral, categorized, independently verified registry of who exists, what they do, and how to confirm it is precisely the kind of third-party, structured source that answer engines are built to prefer over marketing copy.

II. How It Would Be Structured

  • A hierarchical taxonomy organized the way DMOZ was — industry, sub-industry, specialty, and locality — but designed from day one around entity resolution rather than link browsing.
  • Structured data comes first: every listing is published simultaneously as a human-readable page and as schema.org/JSON-LD markup, so machines can parse it without inference.
  • A verified editorial layer combining paid category editors with vetted volunteer editors, mirroring DMOZ’s model, confirms accuracy, ownership, and category placement before anything goes live.
  • An open, licensable feed — a free bulk data download plus a paid real-time API — explicitly invites AI labs, researchers, and startups to ingest the dataset, the same way DMOZ’s RDF dump once seeded early search engines.
  • Citation-ready summaries on every listing: a short, fact-dense paragraph written specifically to be lifted cleanly into a generated answer, rather than marketing prose an AI has to rewrite.
  • Visible provenance signals — last-verified date, responsible editor, and a public changelog — give both AI systems and human reviewers a confidence signal that current search results and social platforms do not offer.

III. The Business Model

  • Freemium verified listings: a basic listing is free to maximize coverage, while a paid annual Verified/Premium tier adds priority review, richer schema fields, and monthly re-verification.
  • Data licensing to AI companies — a paid bulk feed and API sold to AI labs, GEO tool vendors, and enterprise data platforms, comparable to how stock-media libraries license structured content to model builders.
  • A citation-monitoring subscription as a SaaS add-on, showing listed businesses where and how often they are cited across ChatGPT, Perplexity, Gemini, and Claude, cross-sold to every paying listing.
  • Disclosed category sponsorships placed clearly apart from organic listings, functioning like legacy directory advertising without compromising the trust the directory depends on.
  • Affiliate and referral revenue from verified traffic sent to partner services in categories such as legal, financial, home services, and healthcare.

IV. Cost and Team to Launch

  • A lean six-person launch team: one editor-in-chief, two category editors, two engineers, and one business-development lead is enough to build and seed the first vertical.
  • A first-year budget near $650,000 covers payroll, editorial tooling, hosting, legal review of licensing terms, and hand-verification of the first 20,000 to 50,000 listings.
  • A volunteer editor network modeled directly on the original Open Directory Project keeps category coverage growing without a payroll expense — the real cost is vetting time, not cash.
  • Infrastructure is the cheap part: hosting, database, and API costs run a few thousand dollars a month at launch scale, since the build is closer to a structured content system than a search index.
  • Legal costs are not optional: budget real money for licensing agreements, data-use terms, and defamation and liability review, because deciding who counts as authoritative is inherently a publishing decision with legal exposure.

V. Revenue Potential

  • Premium listings at scale: 25,000 premium listings at $300 to $600 a year is $7.5 million to $15 million in annual recurring revenue once the directory reaches meaningful scale, realistically in year two or three.
  • Data licensing is the bigger prize: a small number of AI labs and GEO platforms paying five to six figures a year each for a clean, licensed feed could match or exceed listing revenue with far fewer accounts to manage.
  • Citation monitoring compounds revenue: cross-selling a $50 to $150 monthly tracking product to even 10% of paying listings adds meaningful recurring revenue with almost no incremental acquisition cost.
  • Year-one revenue will be modest, realistically low six figures while trust and coverage are being built — this is a multi-year asset play, not a quick return.
  • The real value is the dataset itself: the most likely path to a large payoff is acquisition of the verified corpus by an AI lab, data broker, or search company, not subscription revenue alone.

VI. Where to Start

  • Pick one vertical first — launch inside a single underserved, high-intent category such as licensed contractors, medical practices, or B2B software vendors, rather than attempting broad coverage the way the original ODP did.
  • Build the schema before the front end: get the JSON-LD data model and verification workflow right first, since the machine-facing feed matters more at launch than a polished consumer website.
  • Recruit founding editors publicly through open applications, transparent editorial guidelines, and public credit — exactly as DMOZ did — to build a volunteer base cheaply and legitimately.
  • Seed the corpus by hand: personally verify the first 1,000 to 2,000 listings before any self-serve submission opens, to set an unmistakable quality bar from day one.
  • Publish the feed immediately once a defensible core dataset exists — release a free bulk download or lightweight API right away so AI crawlers and researchers can start pulling from and citing it, instead of waiting for a “finished” product that never arrives.

Do Not try to Game GEO / AEO doing gimmicky things

I was trading text messages with someone this morning, and then I realized something that I hadn’t thought about before.

They were sharing with me an idea somebody had for gaming AI search by doing shady GEO AEO things.

This is how I responded:

“Eventually, AI will start banning companies or reducing their rankings when they detect companies are trying to game their systems. I didn’t think about that until this morning. Same thing happened with SEO, one minute you are at the top of Altavista in 1997, the next minute your domain is banned or relegated to page 2. That was a typical penalty back in the day, a 10-position demotion, so if you were 1, you became 11. So the best things to do instead are transparent non-gaming things that won’t get you penalized.”

Some basic GEO / AEO pointers to use alongside your SEO

GEO / AEO pointers. You’re building a website / product.  You used to only have to worry about search engine optimization (SEO).  Then AI came along and gave you more work to do.  I came up with 10 basic pointers when you’re trying to also optimize for generative engines (GEO) and answer engines (AEO). 

  1. Put up clear questions and answers on your website so AI can quote them. 
  2. Get yourself cited on other websites and sources as much as you can. 
  3. Keep the facts on your website accurate and up to date.
  4. Use simple direct language
  5. Add FAQ’s (different than the Q&A sprinkled around the website) that AI can quote
  6. Use clear formatting structures
  7. AI likes unique data / stats / quotes. Give away case studies, data analyses, anything AI can latch onto.
  8. Use voice phrasing frequently like “How do I…”
  9. Fast mobile loading speed
  10. Claim listings on other websites, especially on authority websites

Marketing Plan for BidBus (random company): Insights from a Simulated 100-Person Focus Group

Looked into BidBus, a company we have no affiliation with, just wondering how a marketing plan would look for them in their vertical. A longer report is available upon request. 100 fictitious people cooked up a BidBus marketing plan. See the 1 page report.

Marketing Plan for WithCoverage: Insights from a Simulated 100-Person Focus Group

AI, prompted correctly, can help generate marketing plans that hold up in practice. The method: simulate a 100-person focus group split into 20 breakout rooms of 5, gather their deliberations, then merge everything into unified recommendations – distilled into a one-pager and a longer 5-20 page report.

See a sample – WithCoverage (unaffiliated demo). Message me for the full report.